RECENT CASES.
AGENcY-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR TRAVELING ] XPENSES OF SALESMAN

-A manufacturing company was sued for the price of meals, lodging, and
automobile service furnished to one of its salesmen. Held: It was not
within the scope of the salesman's apparent authority to incur traveling expenses upon the principal's credit. Oxweld v. Hughes, 95 Atl. 45 (Md. 1915).
It is a fundamental rule in agency that every authority carries with it,
unless the contrary be shown, the implied authority to do such incidental
acts as are necessary to carry into effect that authority. Baldwin v. Garrett,
III Ga. 876 (Igoo).
On this principle it is held that a salesman has implied authority to hire a horse and carriage to transport himself and samples
to points not reached by railroads. Bentley v. Doggett, 51 Wis. 224 (1881) ;
Huntley v. Mathais, go N. C. I0i (1884). Even though the principal provided
the salesman with cash for such expenses, he is liable to one who in good
faith supplied the agent. Bentley v. Doggett, supra.
However, authority to canvass for sales has been held not per se,
to imply power to hire a horse to facilitate the agent's movements. Howe
Machine Co. v. Ashley, 6o Ala. 496 (1877). On the other hand the pledging
of the principal's credit for hotel bills is held beyond the scope of a sales
agent's apparent authority, Covington v. Newberger, 99 N. C. 523 (1888);
Nicholson v. Pease, 61 Vt. 534 (I889) ; although he will be liable if, after
notice that the agent has not paid his bill, he then pays or allows it to the
agent. Grand Ave. Hotel Co. v. Friedman, 83 Mo. App. 491 (1goo). This
apparently arbitrary distinction has been explained on the ground that expenses incurred in transporting the salesman to various points are peculiar
to the employment in that the agent is doing something which he would
not do otherwise, while hotel bills are not necessarily within the employment, for the agent must eat and sleep whether employed or not. Moreover,
the natural supposition, as well as the general custom of business men,
is that the agent's credit, not the principal's, is looked to, and that the
agent in turn is supplied with funds or looks to the principal for reimbursement. See Mechem: Agency, 2nd Ed., § 877.
AGENCY-NEGLIGENT ACT OF EMPLOYEE-A trespasser was ejected from
a freight train going twenty miles an hour, though the employees of the
railroad company had been instructed to expel trespassers only when the
train was at rest. Held: He could recover. Dunne v. Pa. R. R. Co., 249

Pa. 76 (1915).

It is well settled that the master is liable for the servant's negligent
act within the scope of his authority even when directly contrary to the
orders of the master. Seymour v. Greenwood, 7 Hurlst. & N. 335 (Eng.
i861). Where, however, the act is malicious or wilful and done to gratify
some personal animosity on the part of the servant, the great weight of
authority "holds the master free from liability. Berryman v. Rwy. Co., 228
Pa. 621 (igio). But the trend of judicial opinion is toward amplifying the master's liability. 6 Labatt: Master and Servant (2nd Ed.), 6771.
A few of the early cases extended the master's liability to include negligent
and wilful acts, Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364 (1807), but today the
distinction between negligent and wilful acts is carefully drawn. McManus
v. Crickett, I East io6 (i8oo) ; Aiken v. Rwy., 184 Mass. 269 (Io3); Brennan v. Merchant Co., 2o5 Pa. 258 (19o3); Rounds v. Rwy., 64 N. Y. 129
(1876); but see contra Dealy v. Cobb, 112 App. Div. 296 (N. Y. 19o6).
The distinction between a negligent and a malicious or. wilful act is often
a matter of great nicety. Brennan v. Merchant Co., supra.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

96
BI.LS

AND

NoTEs-FIciTIOUS PAYEE-Regulations of the United States

Treasury Department provided that any check drawn by a disbursing officer
on moneys deposited must be in favor of the person, by name, to whom the
payment was to be made and payable to order. A disbursing agent drew
checks upon a national depositary having notice of the Treasury Regulations,
in the name of a fictitious payee. The bank paid the checks on forged
indorsements of the officer who misappropriated the money. Held: The
bank was liable to the government. National Bank of Commerce v. United
States, 224 Fed. 679 (1915).

If a bank makes payment upon a check to which its depositor's name
has been forged, or upon his genuine check to which the name of a necessary indorser has been forged, it is held to have paid out of its own funds,
and cannot charge the depositor unless on the ground of estoppel or negligence. Harter v. Mechanics' National Bank of Trenton, 63 N. J. L 578
Obviously, the question as to the genuineness of the indorser's
(1899).
signature cannot arise as between the bank and the depositor, if the check
is payable to bearer. The Negotiable Instruments Law, § 9, par. 3, provides,
as did a statute in the principak case, that "the instrument is payable to
bearer when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person,
and such fact was known to the person making it so payable" This is but
an expression of the pre-existing law. Minet v. Gibson, 3 T. R. 481 (1789) ;
Armstrong v. Pomeroy National Bank, 46 Ohio St. 512 (1889). The mere
fact that the parties make use of the name of a real person in designating
the payee, will not prevent the instrument from being one payable to a
fictitious person and so, under the statute, to bearer, where there was no
intention on the part of any of the parties to connect such person with the
transaction. Snyder v. Corn Exchange National Bank, 221 Pa. 599 (I9O8) ;
Seaboard National Bank v. Bank of America, 193 N. Y. 26 (i1os). But
if a check is drawn in favor of one whom the drawer supposes to be a real
person, but, no such person exists, the case does not fall within the statute.
Harmon v. Old Detroit National Bank, 153 Mich. 73 (igo). In the principal case, it was held that the check could not be treated as payable to
bearer under the statute because the defendant bank, being a national depositary, was bound to take notice of the Treasury Regulation that checks
must be payable to the payee or order.
CIVIL PROCEDURE-RELEASE OF ONE OF SEVERAL TORT FEAsoRs-In a suit
for negligence for the death of the plaintiff's decedent, a settlement of a
former suit against the decedent's employer, based on the same cause, is a
bar even though the employer and the defendant were not joint tort feasors.
State v. Maryland Electric Rwy. Co., 95 Atl. 43 (Md. 1915).
As to the principle that there can be but one full satisfaction for a
single wrong the cases are generally in accord, but there is considerable
confusion in the application of the rule. One line of cases holds that a
release of one co-tort feasor is a release of all the others even though the
release expressly provides that a right of action against the others is reserved. Flynn v. Manson, ig Cal. App. 400 (1912); Gelbert v. Timms, 28
Ohio C. C. io7 (i907); McBride v. Scott, 132 Mich. 176 (i9o3). Other
cases hold that such a release affects the other wrongdoers pro tanto only.
Parry v. Crull, ioiN. E. 756 (nd. App. 1913); Telephone Co. v. Fields,

iso Ala. 306 (igo7); Railroad v. Averil, 224 Ill. 5i6 (196). The better
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negligence of one other than his employer, the fact that satisfaction was
received from the former did not preclude full recovery from the employer
under the Act. Paving Co. v. Klotz, 85 N. J. L. 432 (1914).
CONTEMPT-PUBLICATIONS

RELATING TO

PENDING

LITIGATION-A

news-

paper, disregarding an order of the court, published an article containing
information in regard to certain affidavits which had been declared inadmissible in a suit pending at the time. Held: It was .clearly within the
power of the court to punish such an offense as contempt. Tate v. State,
177 S. W. 69 (Tenn. 1915).
There is no dissension in the authorities as to the right of courts to
punish for contempt publishers who issue for general circulation matter
which is calculated to impede, embarrass, or affect the orderly trial of
cases. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 449 (19o5); People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195 (1872). The power to punish such an offense is
inherent in the courts as a necessary incident to their judicial powers.
State v. Morrill, I6 Ark. 384 (1855). The liberty of the press stops where
a further exercise would invade the rights of others and cannot be pleaded
as giving a right to assail litigants, to intimidate witnesses, or to spread
before a jury opinions on the merits of a case before them. ln re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526 (1893). But the publication, no matter how defamatory it
may be, cannot be regarded as contempt unless it is written and published
with reference to a case then pending before the court. Cheadle v. State,
riO Ind. 301 (1886); State v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. I (1897). Moreover,
it is not necessary to show that the matter was read by members of the
jury. It is sufficient that it had general circulation at the place where
the trial was had. Telegram Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294 (1898).
Since the gravamen of the charge is not the truth or falsity of the article
in question but the publication of such matters that tend to prejudice the
public and the jury, and thereby prevent a fair and impartial trial, the truth
of the publication cannot be set up as a defense. Hughes v. Territory, 85
Pac. io58 (Ariz. 19o6) ; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454 (9o6).
CONTRACTS-MASTER AND SERVANT-RESTRAINT OF COMPETITION-A saleswoman covenanted with her employer not to entice away customers from
him after she left his employ, nor to advertise that she was late in his employment. Held: The extension of the covenant to customers at any
future date was not reasonable. Konski v. Peet, 112 L. T. 1107 (Eng. 1915).
The general rule is that any restriction an agreement imposes on the
freedom of action of a servant must not be greater than is reasonably
necessary for the protection of the master in his business. Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co. [1913] A. C. 724; Styles v. Lyon, 86 Ad. 564
(Conn. 1913). An employment of such a nature as to inform the employee
of business methods and trade secrets, which if brought to the knowledge
of competitors would prejudice the interests of the employer, tends to give
an element of reasonableness to the covenant. Magnolia Metal Co. v. Price,
65 App. Div. 276 (N. Y. 19Ol); Knapp v. Adams Co., 135 Fed. ioo8 (195o).
The restriction may properly be made to extend to the limits of the territory
to which the business of the employer is likely to go. Tillinghast v. Boothby, 2o R. I. 59 (1897); Erie County Milk Ass'n v. Ripley, 18 Pa. Super.
Ct. 28 (1902). But if the prohibition applies to a territory larger than the
interests of the employer require, it is held void as unreasonable. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Nemnich, 83 Mo. App. 6 (1899); Hooper v.
Willis, 93 L. T. (N. S.) 236 (Eng. i9o5). It has been held that the time
of the operation of the prohibition may be extended beyond the lifetime of
the person for whose benefit it is made, in order to protect his heirs or
assigns. Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & El. 438 (Eng. 1837). A few cases
have held that where the condition is burdensome and might seriously interfere with the ability of the employee to earn a living, there is no adequate
consideration for so important a concession. Oppenheimer v. Hirsch, 5 App.
Piv. 232 (N. Y. 1896) ; Seward v. Shields, 9 Pa. Dist. Rep. 583 (igoo).
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CRIMINAL LAW-INDUCING CRIMINAL AcTs-Government detectives encouraged and assisted in bringing Chinese into the United States from
Mexico, in violation of a federal statute. Held: Since the intent was
originated by government agents, who encouraged the commission of the
crime, the accused should be absolved on grounds of public policy. Woo

Wai v. United States,

223

Fed. 412 (1915).

There is no doubt as to the general principle that one who aids and
abets in the commission of a criminal act, is a principal and punishable as,
such. People v. Mills, 83 N. Y. Supp. 947 (1913). In the absence of criminal
intent, however, one who aids and abets for the purposes of detecting the
other party, and disclosing his guilt, has never been held guilty as a principal.
Price v. People, log Ill. iog (1884). But the fact that a criminal has been
so entrapped will not permit him to plead such as a defense. Price v.
United States, 165 U. S. 311 (1897). So if all the acts are done with a
criminal intent, the fact that the crime was instigated by others will not
destroy the criminality of the act. People v. Liphardt, io5 Mich. 8o (1895).
But where the crime is suggested-to the criminal, and its commission is
actively instigated by those who desire to convict an unwilling subject, the
modern tendency is to hold that no crime has been committed. Dalton v.
State, 113 Ga. 1037 (19Ol).

This policy is not supported by the weight of

actual decision, but public sentiment, as well as the inclination of the courts,
frowns upon the practice of entrapping criminals by such methods, and discourages deliberate encouragement and assistance to crime in order that the
criminal may be arrested. People v. McCord, 76 Mich. 200 (1889).
CRIMINAL

LAW-PRESENCE

OF ACCUSED

AT

HEARING

OF APPEAL-A

prisoner was not present at the hearing of his appeal from a conviction for
murder. Held: The constitutional provision that an accuied shall have the
right to be heard applies only to a trial prosecuted by the state and does
not include a review or appeal, which is a proceeding brought by the accused
himself. Vowell v. State, 178 S. W. 768 (Tenn. 1915).
The early English practice required a prisoner to be present in the
appellate court in an appeal because in an indictment for a felony he could
not appear by attorney. This view was adopted by a few of the states. State
v. Miles, 41 S. C. 551 (1894);

State v. Nulty, 57 Vt. 543 (1885).

The

great weight of authority however is contra. Donnely v. State, 26 N. J. L.
601 (1857); Com. v. Cody, 165 Mass. 13 (1896); Schwab v. Berggen, 143
U. S. 442 (1892). When a prisoner breaks jail during the hearing of an
appeal the appeal is dismissed. State v. Handy, 27 Wash. 469 (19o2) ; People
v. Elkins, 122 Cal. 654 (1898); though this doctrine has been repudiated in
some states. State v. Jacobs, 107 N. C. 772 (1890). In some states by statute
the appeal is dismissed as soon as the prisoner escapes from custody, Com.
v. State, 70 S. W. 23 (Tex. 1902); and it having been dismissed the court
will not allow reinstatement. Young v. State, 3 Tex. Cr. App. 384 (1878).
At the trial in the lower court the prisoner under the Constitution has a
right to be present. Some courts hold that he cannot waive this privilege
in the case of a felony, Prime v. Com., 18 Pa. 1O3 (1851) ; Hopt v. Utah,
110 U. S. 574 (1883) ; but other courts maintain that it is for the prisoner's
benefit and that he may waive his right. State v. Peacock, 5o N. J. L. 34
(1874). All jurisdictions allow the prisoner to waive his right in a trial for
a misdemeanor. City of Bloomington v. Hieland, 67 Ill. 278 (1873).
EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION OF INNoCENcE-The court in a criminal action
failed to charge upon the presumption of innocence, though no such instruction was asked for. Held: The defendant was entitled to such an instruction,
but it not having been requested the omission was not reversible error. State

v. Sailer, 153 N. W. 271 (Minn. 1915).

The weight of authority is that the defendant in a criminal case is entitled to an instruction on the presumption of innocence, Amos v. State, 123
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Ala. 5o (1899) ; Long v. State, 42 Fla. 5o9 (igoo)'; State v. Mayo, 42 Wash.
54o (9o6); and that the instruction should be requested, Alexis v. U. S.,
63 C. C. A. 502 (19o4); Lackey v. State, 67 Ark. 416 (1goo); McDonald
v. People, 168 IIl. 93 (1897); Mason v. State, 27 Ohio C. C. 526 (19o5).
A few jurisdictions hold that it is the duty of the court to give the instruction whether asked for or not. Sledge v. State, 99 Ga. 684 (189o); French
v. Commonwealth, 88 S. W. 1070 (Ky. 1886). The refusal of the instruction is generally held to be reversible error. Line v. State, 51 Ind. 172
(1875); Reeves v. State, 29 Fla. 527 (1892); People v. Van Houter, 38
Hun 168 (N. Y. 1885). The majority of jurisdictions hold that even where
the court has instructed fully on the doctrine of reasonable doubt, refusal of
further instructions on the presumption of innocence, is reversible error.
State v. Harrison, 57 Pac. 647 (Mont. 1899); Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432
(1895) ; but see contra: State v. Maupin, 93 S. W. 579 (Mo. 19o6). It has
been held that the presumption of innocence is in the nature of evidence
in favor of the person on trial, Coffin v. U. S., supra; but this view has
been vigorously denied. Thayer: Prel. Treat. Ev. 551 et seq. Most writers
hold it to be a rule of law which acts as a warning to the jury, not to be
prejudiced by the fact of the defendant being charged with guilt and held
on the charge. Thayer: Ev. 348; 4 Wigmore: Ev. 251; Wharton: Crim.
Ev. II, 1817.
EVIDENcE-RAPE-COMPLAINT-In an indictment for rape, evidence was
offered that the prosecutrix had made complaint to her sister eight or ten
hours afterwards. Held: The evidence should be admitted. State v.
Schaeffer, 94 At. 598 (N. J. 1915).
The general rule is that after the prosecutrix has testified to the commission of the outrage upon her, it is competent for the prosecution to
prove, either by her or other witnesses that recently after the perpetration
of the offense, she made complaint to those to whom complaint of such an
occurrence would naturally be made. But such testimony is confined to the
bare fact of complaint, and neither the details of the occurrence nor the
name of the offender, can be so proved. People v. Mayes, 66 Cal. 597
(x885) ; People v. Marrs, 125 Mich. 376 (igoo) ; State v. Ivins, 36 N. J. L.
233 (1873). The purpose of admitting such evidence is not merely to corroborate the facts testified to at the trial, but to meet in advance a selfcontradiction in the conduct of the prosecutrix which, if unexplained, would
discredit her as a witness. People v. McGee, i Denio ig (N. Y. 1845);
State v. Rodesky, go Atl. iogg (N. J. 1914). Another view is that this class
of evidence is admitted for the general purpose of confirming the testimony
already given. Com. v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175 (1898); Reg. v. Nicholas,
61 E. C. L. 246 (Eng. 1846); Hannon v. State, 70 Wis. 448 (i888). In
England, and in some few states, it is held, contrary to the general rule,
that the details of the complaint made by the prosecutrix recently after the
alleged outrage upon her, including the name of the offender, may be given
in evidence. Reg. v. Wood, 14 Cox C. C. 46 (Eng. 1877) ; State v. Mitchel,
68 Iowa T16 (1885); Philips v. State, 9 Humph. 246 (Tenn. 1848). The
principal case is in accord with the general rule that lapse of time between
the alleged outrage and the making of complaint does not render the evidence inadmissible, but merely affects its weight. State v. Bebb, 125 Iowa
494 (9o4); People v. Gage, 62 Mich. 271 (1886),; Robertson v. State, 49
S. W. 398 (Tex. 18g9).
EVIDENcE-REs GESTAE-MEMORANDu-Immediately after a collision
the driver of an engine signed a written memorandum in which he admitted
that he was at fault. Held: The memorandum was not admissible as part
of the res gestae because it lacked spontaneity. Tustin v. Arnold, 113 L. T.
95 (Eng. 1915)Res gestae declarations are admissible as undesigned incidents of a
transaction which would not be complete or perfectly understood without
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them. Kenney v. State, 79 S. W. 817 (Tex. i9o3). The declarant is not
regarded as a witness but as merely the passive instrument through which
the event itself speaks. Murray v. Boston and M. R. R. Co., 54 At. 289
(N. H. i9O3). The modern tendency with respect to what may be admissible
as res gestae is inclined to be more liberal than the early view. Jack v.
Mutual Reserve Ass'n, 113 Fed. 49 (i92). The early rule confined such
evidence to those declarations occurring during the actual continuance of
the main event. Johnson v. State, 58 Pac. 761 (Wy. 1899); Rex v. Bedingfield, 14 Cox C. C. 341 (Eng. 1879). The principal case is in accord with
the weight of authority in holding that the declaration must explain or
characterize the main transaction of which it is a part. Reem v. St. Paul Ry.,
77 Minn. 5o3 (i899) ; Downer v. Strafford, 47 Vt. 579 (1874). It must be
a spontaneous utterance so as to exclude the presumption of premeditation
or design. Heckle v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 123 Cal. 44I (i899); Scheir v.
Quirin, 77 App. Div. 624 (N. Y. i92); Marter v. Texas and Pac. R. R.,
Co., 52 La. Ann. 727 (I9OO). It must not be a purely narrative statement of
a past transaction. People v. Wong Ark, 96 Cal. 125 (1892); Briggs v.
East Board Co., 26 Pa. 56 4 (io3). Light may be thrown on the issue of
spontaneity by the form of the statement itself. Futch v. State, 9o Ga. 472
(1892).
So a letter written immediately after the principal transaction has
been held inadmissible as part of the res gestae. Small v. Giliman, 48 Me.
5o6 (i86o). For a complete discussion of this subject see 5I UNIV. OF PENNA.
L.

Rv. 187.

EVIDENCE-TEsTiMONY AT FoRmER TRi.L-IDNTirY OF THE PARriEs-The
plaintiff had brought an action in his daughter's name as her next friend to
recover damages for her injury from a collision between his buggy and the
defendant's street car. In the plaintiffs action for his own injury in the
same collision, the testimony of the motorman, since deceased, given in the
daughter's action, was offered in evidence. Held: The testimony should have
been admitted as there was a substantial identity of parties and the right of
cross-examination in the former trial by the same counsel. Lyon v. Rhode
Island Co., 94 Atl. 893 (R. I. 1915).
One exception to the rule rejecting hearsay evidence is the testimony of
deceased witnesses, given in a former action between the same parties and
involving the same issues. Hughes v. Clark, 67 Ga. I9 (I88i); Simons v.
State, 5 Oh. St 343 (1856). The testimony may be given also in cases
where the former parties and the present parties are privies in interest,
Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Hart, 167 S. W. 683 (Ky. I914);

Stephens v. Hoffman, io4 N. W. Iogo (Ill. 1914), and it is well settled that

the former testimony is receivable if the difference of parties consists
merely in a difference of nominal parties only. Pratt, Hurst & Co. v. Tailer,
u9 N. Y. S. 8o3 (igo9); Goodrich v. Pearson, 33 Ill. 498 (1864). One of
the controlling reasons for the admission of testimony of this character is
that there has been the right of cross-examination in the previous action.
In re Durant, 8o Conn. i4o (i9o7); Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co. v.
Meyers, 8o Fed. 361 (i897). For cases in accord with the principal case
where the parties are not precisely the same but substantially so, see Minea
v. St. Louis Cooperage Co., 179 Mo. App. 715 (1914); Smith v. Keyser, 22
So. Rep. 149 (Ala. i897). But see contra, Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. Gumby,
99 Fed. 192 (Igoo).
JUDGMENTS-EQuITABLE RELIEF-The complainant sought to be relieved
in equity from a judgment on the ground that he was induced by fraudulent representations to enter into the guaranty upon which the judgment was
obtained. Held: Equity will afford a remedy where fraud has been practiced in procuring a judgment, but the fraud must relate to the procuring
of the judgment, and not to the transaction which is the basis of it. Whitcomb v. Schultz, 223 Fed, 268 (1915).
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Where a defense was available in a suit at law and was neglected to be
made, a suit in equity cannot thereafter be maintained to set aside or enjoin
the judgment, Jimmerson v. Fordyce Lumber Co., 152 S. W. 1022 (Ark.
1913); Day v. Hurchman, 6i So. 445 (Fla. 1913); nor will it be set aside
on the ground of false evidence. Evans v. Woodsworth, 213 Ill. 404 (905).
But it has been held that where the plaintiff commits wilful perjury, the
judgment will be set aside. Wickel v. Mertz, 49 Pa. Super. 472 (1912). The
principal case is in accord with the great weight of authority that equity
will not enjoin the collection of a judgment on the ground of fraud in the
execution of the contract on which the judgment is based. Oxley Stave Co.
v. Butler County, 121 Mo. 614 (i894); Gardner v. Van Alstyne, 163 N. Y.
573 09oo). But see contra, Anderson v. Field, 6 Ill. App. 307 (i88o). But
the fraud must relate to the procurement of the judgment whereby the court
has been fraudulently imposed upon, Hollister v. Sloan, I71 Ill. App. 616
(1913) ; or whereby the innocent party has been prevented from maintaining
a meritorious defense by the other's fraud. Davis v. Hibernia Savings &
Loan Society, 132 Pac. 462 (Cal. 1913). And so, also, to entitle the one
defrauded to relief, he must have used diligence on his part to prevent the
fraud. Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Gilbert, III Fed. 269 (i9oI).
LANDLORD

AND

TENANT-DEFECTIVE

PREMISEs-RooF

OF

APARTMENT

HousE-A tenant in a top apartment was injured through the falling of the
ceiling caused by water leaking through the roof. Held: The landlord was
liable to the tenant injured through his negligence. Perry v. Levy, 94 Atl. 561
(N. J. 1915).

The general rule is well recognized that a landlord is not liable for injuries sustained by a tenant or his family, or guests, by reason of the ruinous condition of the premises demised. Siggins v. McGill, 72 N. J. L 265
(i9o5); Witty v. Matthews, 52 N. Y. 512 (1873); Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa.
St. 429 (1872); Sheets v. Selden, 7 Wall. 416 (U. S. 1868). But this rule
applies only to those premises which have passed out of the control of the
landlord into the exclusive possession of the tenant. Looney v. McLean, 129
Mass. 33 (i88o). Ordinarily the ceiling in itself is considered a part of
the "demised premises." Schwartz v. Apple, 48 N. Y. Supp. 253. The rule,
however, does not apply to those parts which are retained by the landlord
for the common use of all, such as passageways, stairways, etc. As to these
portions of the premiges the landlord is responsible, most cases proceeding
on the theory of an implied covenant. Gleason v. Boehm, 58 N. J. L. 475
(1896); Looney v. McLean, supra; Watkins v. Goodall, i38 Mass. 533
(1885); Bogendoerfer v. Jacobs, 89 N. Y. Supp. 1051 (1904).
The basis of the reasoning in the principal case is the fact that the landlord was in control of the roof. Most cases hold this to be the determining
factor. Gilland v. Maynes, 216 Mass. 581 (1914), where the landlord retained control of the outside of the building; Rauth v. Davenport, 14 N. Y.
69 (i89I), where the landlord retained control of the roof; Glickauf v.
Mauer, 75 Ill. 289 (;I874), though here the landlord, in addition to having
control-of the roof, himself occupied the top apartment. Similarly, where
the landlord dwells immediately under the roof, he has been held liable
and the tenant has not been required to give notice. Guntham v. Castlebury,
49 Ga. 272 (1873). But see contra, Krueger v. Ferrant, 29 Minn. 385 (1882),
denying the landlord's liability through his control of the roof and also
that the landlord is impliedly a covenantor. Of course, where it is expressly
covenanted that control is surrendered to the tenant, then such covenant
governs. Hazlip v. Rosenberg, 63 Ark. 43o (1897); Marley v. Wheelwright,
172 Mass. 530 (i899).
For a complete discussion of this subject see 6 AmcAN LAw REvIEw,
6r4, and authorities cited therein.
LICENSEs-UsE OF STREETS-JITNEYS-A petition was filed to restrain
the enforcement of an ordinance regulating the operation of jitney busses.
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Held: An injunction should not be granted. Greene v. City of San Antonio,
178 S. W. 6 (Tex. 1915.)
A statute providing that cities may grant licenses for any lawful purpose and fix the amount to be paid, authorizes the licensing of vehicles for
hire. City of Seattle v. King, 78 Wash. 277 (1913); Johnson v. City of
Macon, 114 Ga. 426 (igoi); City of Terre Haute v. Kersey, 159 Ind. 300

So a city ordinance regulating the operation of jitneys is reason(1902).
able, constitutional, and within the municipal authority granted to the city
by the state legislature, and is not invalid as class legislation. State
v. Howell,

147

Pac.

1159

(Wash.

1915);

Georgia

Railway

& Power

Co. v. Jitney Bus Co. P. U. R. 1915 C. 928 (Ga.). So also ordinances
requiring owners of jitney busses to file bonds are valid and not discriminative. Ex parte Cardinal, I5O Pac. 348 (Cal. 1915) ; ex parte Dickey, 85 S. E.
781 (W. Va. 1915). As to whether a city can completely banish jitneys off the
streets there are but few decisions. The principal case intimates that it can,
but see apparently contra, Logan & Sons v. Pyne, 43 Iowa 524 (1876). The
grant of authority by the state to municipal corporations to license jitneys
is an implied grant of a state franchise to permit their operation as common
carriers. Ex parte Dickey supra; McGregor v. Erie R. R. Co., 35 N. J. L. 89
(187).
MASTER AND SERVANT-DEPARTURE

FROM EMPLOYMENT-A

chauffeur was

directed by his employer to go to his own home for supper and return, but
instead drove past his residence on a mission of his own and negligently ran
down the plaintiff. Held: The employer was not liable as the servant had
wholly departed from his employment. Provo v. Conrad, iog N. W. 753
(Minn. 1915).

It is the general rule that beyond the scope of his employment, a servant is as much a stranger to his master as though he were a third person.
Krzikowsky v. Sperring, io7 App. Div. 493 (Ill. 1903). To charge the
master it must appear that the act of the servant constituting the misconduct was expressly or impliedly within the scope of the servant's employIf the
ment. Barmore v. Vicksburg S. & P. Rwy. Co., 85 Miss. 426 (9o5).
servant were at the time acting for himself and as his own master pro tenpore, the master is not liable. Chicago Consolidated Bottling Co. v. McGinnis, 51 Ill. App. 325 (1894). Each case necessarily depends largely upon its
own facts. The principal case is of interest chiefly as illustrative of one set
of circumstances.
NEGLIGENCE-CONDITION AND USE OF PREMISES-A friend of a shipper
using the shipping platform of a railroad was injured in a fall from a stairway, known to be defective. Held: As the plaintiff was there upon the im-plied invitation of the railroad, the railroad was liable because of its failure to exercise reasonable care. Southern Railway Co. v. Bates, 69 So. 131

(Ala. 1915).

It is well settled that one who comes on the premises of another with
the mere leave of the owner, and for his own purposes, is a bare licensee
and takes the premises subject to concomitant risks. Gillis v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 59 Pa. 129 (1869). A higher degree of care is demanded in
the case of an invitee, where the owner of the premises is under a duty to
be reasonably sure that he is not inviting the one who comes on the property, whether for his own or any other purpose, into danger, and to that end
he must exercise ordinary prudence to render the premises reasonably safe.
Bennett v. L. & N. Railway Co., 102 U. S. 577 (i88o). A still higher degree
of duty is imposed upon one who engages in a public business. Christopher
Co. v. Russell, 63 Fla. 191 (1912). The same rule applies to any property
owner, who expressly or impliedly invites another to use his premises. The
direct object of the visit need not be for the benefit of the owner, so long
as there is mutuality of interest, from which the invitation can be implied.

RECENT CASES
In such cases the owner is answerable for the consequences of dangerous
conditions, which could have been remedied by the exercise of ordinary
care. Foster v. Mining Co., 114 Fed. 613 (19o2).
ToLIABILITY TO CONSUMER-CHEwING
NEGLIGENCE-MANUFACTURERS'
BACCo-A purchaser from a retail dealer of a plug. of tobacco bit into a bug
imbedded therein and was seriously poisoned. Held: The manufacturer was
not liable. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 178 S. W. 1oo0 (Tenn.
I915).
The general rule is that a contractor, manufacturer, or vendor is not
liable to third parties who have no contractual relations with him, for negligence in the construction, manufacture or sale of the article he handles, on
the theory that no duty beyond that of contract is imposed on the manufacturer. See the leading case of Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., I2O
Fed. 865 (19o3) and authorities cited therein. To this rule there are several exceptions which are well recognized, e. g., foodstuffs, drugs, and inherently dangerous articles, in the manufacture of which the highest degree of
care is necessary. Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N. J. L. 748 (i9o8);
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 3§7 (1852); Huset v. Machine Co., supra.
As to the classification of tobacco, the few previous decisions have held that
it is not a drug or medicine within the meaning of the statutes excepting
drugs and medicines from their operation, such as statutes prohibiting the
sale of merchandise on Sunday; State v. Ohmer, 34 Mo. App. 115 (1889);
Comm. v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68 (1889); Penniston v. City of Newnan,
117 Ga. 700 (19o3). That it is not a foodstuff is decided chiefly because it
contains no nutriment, promotes no tissue growth, is in some respects deteriorating, and is a mere narcotic. That it is to be placed in the mouth
and masticated is immaterial. State v. Ohmer, supra. Obviously chewing
tobacco is not inherently dangerous.
NEGLIGENCE-MANUFACTURERS'

LIABILITY TO CONSUMER-PoIsONOUS

SUB-

STANcES-A soda water drink was negligently placed and sealed within a bottle
containing a cigar stub, resulting in the illness of a consumer. Held: The
consumer could recover directly from the manufacturer even though an intermediate retailer was the immediate vendor. Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling
Works, I77 S. W. 8o (Tenn. 1915).

To the general rule that a manufacturer is not liable to a consumer unless there be privity of contract, there exists the well recognized exception
in connection with sealed food products where defects are not easily detectable prior to actual consumption. The various decisions are placed on
different grounds. Some courts proceed upon the negligence of the manufacturer, implied from failure to comply with pure food statutes. Meshberger v. Channelline Oil Co., IIg N. W. 428 (Minn. i9o9); Haley v. Swift, 152.
Wis. 570 (913). Another ground is that of implied warranty. Mazetti v.
Armour, 135 Pacific 633 (Wash. 1913). Some courts hold that a contractual relation is not necessary and that the original sale of such an article is
wrongful, thereby making the wrongdoer responsible to everyone for the
natural consequences of his act. Weiser v. Holzmann, 33 Wash. 87 (I9O3).
Likewise it has been held that the manufacturer's liability rests upon "the
demands of social justice." Ketterer v. Armour, 2oo Fed. 322 (1912).
In some cases, however, the court has declined to make the exception,
choosing to regard privity of contract as essential. Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352 (1905).

The court in the principal case based its decision on the resulting responsibility of one who undertakes the performance of an act, which if not
done with care and skill will imperil the lives of others. This is in accord
with the so-called "patent or proprietary medicine cases". Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852); Tomlinson v. Armour, 75 N. J. L. 748 (19o8).
For a full discussion of this class of cases see note to McKibbin v. Bax,
13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 646.
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NEGLIGENcE-PHYsICIANS AND SURGEONs-DuE CARE-A physician, in
operating for appendicitis, left a piece of gauze in the body of the patient.
Held: It was the duty of the physician to see to it that the gauze was re-

moved.

Walker v. Holbrook, 153 N. W. 305 (Minn. 1915).

The highest professional care and skill is not required of a physician,
Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. Va. 266 (i9o6), but the measure is what the average
physician in good practice would ordinarily employ in a similar case under
like circumstances. Hales v. Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232 (gio); Bacon v.
Walsh, 184 Ill. App. 377 (I914). Ordinary care and skill is all that is required, even though the work is of a delicate or unusual nature. Henslin v.
Wheaton, 97 N. W. 882 (Minn. 19o4). But a surgeon who operates must
exercise ordinary care not only in the operation itself, but also in the care
of the patient. Akridge v. Noble, 114 Ga. 949 (19o2). So if the surgeon
himself sews up the wound he must remove the sponges and cannot shift
this duty. Akridge v. Noble, supra; Reynolds v. Smith, 148 Iowa 264 (1gio).
But if the operation is performed in a hospital where the work of sewing
up and dressing the wound is left to others, the operating surgeon is not
liable for their negligence. Hunter v. Stevenson, 89 Atl. 418 (Md.
1913). This is on the theory that it is a recognized custom in hospitals that
a surgeon engaged to perform the actual operation, while nurses and internes are supplied to dress and treat the wound after the operation, Harris v. Fall, 177 Fed. 79 (191o). See also 62 UNIv. OF PENNA. L. REv. 576.
NEGLIGENcE-PRoxIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE-A railroad negligently
started a prairie fire which burned over the land of a near-by property-owner,

whose wife was injured in an endeavor to put it out. Held: The negligence
of the railroad was the proximate cause of the injuries. Wilson v. Northern
Pacific Rwy. Co., 153 N. W. 429 (N. D. 1915).
The weight of authority is that one whose property is exposed to danger
is bound to make such efforts, as an ordinarily prudent man would make,
to save it or prevent its damage, and recovery is allowed for injuries sustained thereby. Page v. Buckport, 64 Me. 51 (1874); I. C. R. R. Co. v.
Siler, 229 Ili. 39o (19o7); Wasmer v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 8o N. Y. 212
(i88o); Cooper v. Ridland Co., 76 S. C. 2o2 (19o7). It is also held that this
applies to attempts to save the property of others, as in the principal case,
Glanz v. C. M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 119 Ia. 6I (i9o7) ; Liming v. Ill. Cent.
Ry. Co., 81 Ia. 216 (i89o); Berg v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 70 Minn. 272
(i89). However there are cases which consider the act of the plaintiff,
whether to put out the fire or to save property, to be the proximate cause,
and the negligent act of the defendant merely the remote cause. Logan v.
Wabash R. R. Co., 96 Mo. App. 461 (1902) ; Cook v. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437
(1885) ; Chattanooga L. & P. Co. v. Hodges, iog Tenn. 331 (192) ; Crowley
v. City of West End, 149 Ala. 613 (197o).
NUISANCE-STORAGE OF ExpLOsivEs-A powder company stored explosives on its premises, whereupon an adjacent property owner claimed
damages for the alleged diminution of the market value of his property.
Held: An injunction should not be granted. Simpson v. Du Pont Powder
Co., 85 S. F. 344 (Ga. 1915).
Practically all American jurisdictions are in accord in holding that the
keeping or manufacture of explosives is not a nuisance, per se. Heig v.
Licht, 80 N. Y. 579 (188o). Whether or not it is a nuisance in any particular case, depends upon the locality, the quantity stored, the method of
handling, and the surrounding circumstances. Collins v. Alabama, lO4 Ala.
39o (1893). A business lawful in itself cannot be a nuisance, per se, although
it may become a nuisance in fact because of surrounding places or circumstances, or because of the manner in which it is conducted. Windfall Mfg.
Co. v. Patterson, 148 Ind. 414 (1897). Mere offensiveness cannot constitute a
nuisance, per se. Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448 (1871). It is not
enough to show a probable and contingent injury, but it must be shown to be
inevitable and undoubted. McCutcheon v. Blanton, 59 Miss. 116 (i88i).

RECENT CASES
PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSiON-In an action of ejectment the defendant
admitted that his predecessor in title had entered under a parol gift. Held:
When the original entry is not adverse the holder of the record title must
have actual notice of the claim of adverse possession. O'Boyle v. Kelly,
94 At.. 448 (Pa. 1915).
The foundation of a prescriptive title is a presumed grant by the party
adversely affected; and where it appears that the enjoyment has existed by
the consent of such party, no presumption of grant can be made. Klein v.
Gehrung, 25 Texas Sup. Ct. Supp. 232 (186o). So also where an entry is under
a parol gift, the holding will be deemed permissive and not adverse until the
occupier openly asserts title in himself. Tippenhauer v. Tippenhauer, 158
As to whether the record title holder need have actual
Ky. 639 (1914).
notice or imputed knowledge of the adverse claim or not there is a conflict
of authority. Some cases hold such notice necessary. Gee v. Hatley, 170
S. W. 72 (Ark. 1914); Leavenworth v. Reeves, 64 So. 66o (Miss. 1914);
White v. Shippee, 216 Mass. 23 (1913); Hooper v. Acuff, 159 S. W. 934
(Tex. App. 1913). Other cases are contra. Whitely County Land Co. v.
Power's Heirs, 146 Ky. 8oi (1912); Craven v. Craven, 1O3 N. E. 333 (Ind.
But such a
1913); Timmerman v. Cohn, 128 N. Y. Supp. 770 (1911).
possession is not to be made out by inference and every presumption is in
favor of possession in subordination to the title of the true owner. Flesher
v. Callahan, 122 Pac. 489 (Okla. 1912); Janke v. McMahon, 133 Pac. 21
(Cal. App. 1913); Sheppick v. Sheppick, 138 Pac. ii69 (Utah 1914). For a
decision very similar to that in the principal case see Johns v. Johns, 244
Pa. 48 (1914).
PUBLIC OFFICE-CAN A WOMAN BE A NOTARY PUBLIC?-A state constitution restricted the right of suffrage and the privilege of holding office
to men. Under a statute in the state which declared that the position of
notary public should be deemed "a place of trust and profit and not an office", a
woman was appointed a notary. Held: She could not hold the office.
Bickett v. Knight, 85 S. E. 418 (N. C. i915).
The rule that in the absence of a statute expressly so providing women
may not hold the office of notary public, where only men have the right of
suffrage is in accord with the weight of authority. State v. Davidson, 92
Tenn. 53r (1893). The privilege of voting is not a natural right, and where
confered upon men alone, women are excluded from holding office. Minor
v. Heppersett, 88 U. S. 162 (1874). This is on the theory that the constitutional provision that every voter shall be eligible to office, excludes those
not voters from holding office, because only those who are competent to
select the officer shall be competent to hold the office. People v. Hutchinson,
172 Ill. 486 (1898). Most jurisdictions hold that a notary public is a public
officer, People v. Rathbone, r45 N. Y. 434 (1895) ; though it has been held
that the position of notary public is not a "county office." U. S. v. Bixby,
That the legislature cannot change the character of a
9 Fed. 78 (1881).
position by calling it "a place of trust and profit" without changing its
functions, so as to make that which was previously an office not an office,
seems well settled. Wood v. Bellamy, 12o N. C. 212 (1897).
SALES-TImE FOR REMOvAL-A quit claim deed gave the vendee the
privilege of entering the land and removing certain timber for a period of
six years, but no entry was made until ten years after the execution of the
deed. Held: There was no right to remove any timber after the expiration
of six years. Hannan v. Buford, 171 S. W. 662 (Mo. 1915).
The great majority of jurisdictions hold that the sale of timber on a
given tract is a sale of only so much as is removed within the time specified
in the agreement. Wilson v. Scarboro, 79 S. E. 811 (N. C. 1913); Mengal
Co. v. Moore, 114 Tenn. 596 (19o5).
In several states however it is held
that where the purchaser is given a certain time to remove timber, such
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purchaser does not forfeit his right to remove by failure to do so before the
time limit. Halstead v. Jessup, i5o Ind. 85 (i898). In other states the principle maintains that a party has a reasonable time to remove timber after
the expiration of the period mentioned in the deed. Brown Lumber Co. v.
Coal Co., 107 S. W. 733 (Ky. i9o8). A few jurisdictions hold that while the
grantee does not lose title to the timber by failure to remove within the time
set forth in the contract, still he has no further right to go on the land.
Peirce v. Finerty, 76 N. H. 38 (IgII) ; nor can equity give him the right to
enter thereafter. Lumber Co. v. Shepard, 6o So. 825 (Ala. 1913). Where
no specific time is set forth in the deed, it is uniformly held that th vendee
shall have a reasonable time to remove the timber. Heflin v. Bingham, 56
Ala. 566 (1876); Liston v. Lumber Co., 9i S. W. 27 (Ark. i9o5).
The prevailing rule, however, even in those states in which the vendee
loses all claim to timber not removed within the specified time, is that if
the timber has been converted into lumber, the vendee does not lose his
rights therein but may afterwards remove it. Mahan v. Clark, 219 Pa. 229
(i9o8) ; Butler v. McPherson, 95 Miss. 635 (19o9). Sone jurisdictions hold
that the mere felling of the trees is sufficient and that an actual removal
from the land is not essential. Hodges v. Buell, 134 Mich. 162 (igo3). In
such cases cut timber may be removed by the vendee within a reasonable
time after the specified date. Hicks v. Smith, 77 Wis. 146 (i89o). Other
states expressly hold that a felling is in no sense a removal and hence timber
already cut cannot be removed after the expiration of the stipulated time.
Clark v. Lumber Co., 9o Miss. 479 (i9o7); Anderson v. Miami Lumber Co.,
59 Or. 149 (i9ii).
SLANDER-PRIVILEGE-POLITICAL CRiTicisim-An elector falsely stated to
two others that a candidate for Congress, after having been retained to
advocate the passage of a certain bill had accepted a retainer from its
opponents. Held: The privilege of fair criticism of a candidate for public
office does not include the right to make false defamatory statements of fact.
Pattangall v. Mooers, 94 Atl. 561 (Me. 1915).
Candidacy for office excuses the publication of language concerning the
candidate, which would otherwise be slanderous. Nichol4 v. Daily Reporter
Co., 3o Utah 74 (igo5). Discussion of the fitness of the candidate for the
place he seeks, in such a manner as to present the full facts to the electors,
either by contrast or comparison with other candidates, or by analysis of
his individual qualifications, is privileged. Duffy v. N. Y. Evening Post, iog

App. Div. 471 (N. Y.

19o5);

Dauphiny v. Buhne, 153 Cal. 757 (I9o8).

That

such opinions or inferences are "far-fetched," high-strung, severely moral, or
contrary to other opinions or inferences that seem more reasonable is immaterial so long as there is a basis for them in the acts or words of the
candidate. Upton v. Hume, 24 Ore. 42o (1893) ; Black v. State, 93 S. Car.
467 (1912). But criticism and comment is privileged only so long as it is
founded on truth and deals with the public capacity of the person criticized.
Ott v. Murphy, 141 N. W. 463 (Iowa 1913). One who makes a charge against
his personal or moral character must prove the truth of what he says.
Mofford v. Meeks, 129 Ala. 349 (190). Moreover a false statement of fact
is not privileged. Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353 (igoo) ; nor may the publication of admittedly false statements be justified by proving that they were
made in good faith, without malice, and from good motives. Starks v.
Comer, 67 So. 44o (Ala. i915). Some cases hold however that a charge made
against a candidate is privileged if the person making it believes in its truth
on probable grounds regardless of the circumstances that it is a false statement
of fact. Briggs v. Garrett, iii Pa. 4o4 (i886); Herringer v. Ingberg,
91 Minn.
71 (193)..
TORTS-ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-A husband claimed that the father,
mother, brothers and sisters of his wife had alienated her affections. Held:

RECENT CASES
Parents and relatives may advise their children about domestic affairs without incurring liability if the advice be given in good faith. Ratcliffe v.
Walker, 85 S. E. 575 (Va. 1915).

The weight of authority is that a parent may in good faith advise his
children in matters of domestic relations. Hutcheson v. Peck, 5 Johns I96
(N. Y. 18o9) ; Rabe v. Hanna, 5 Ohio 530 (1832). The material question is
the intent with which the parent acted, Smith v. Lyke, 13 Hun 204 (N. Y.
1878) ; and the complaint is defective if it does allege that the alienation
was done maliciously. Reed v. Reed, 6 Ind. App. 232 (1892). However, while
the parent may advise, he may not restrain the daughter from returning to
her husband. Glass v. Bennett, 89 Tenn. 478 (i8gi). Though at common
law the action for alienation was based on the pecuniary loss of service of
the wife, today it is based on the loss of consortium, viz., society, companionship, assistance, etc., and enticement from the husband is not necessary.
Adams v. Maine, 6 Ind. App. 232 (1892). At common law the wife could
not sue for the alienation of her husband's affections, but under statutes in
most states this disability is now removed, Mehrhoff v. Mehrhoff, 26 Fed.
13 (i886); though several states still hold to the early rule. Hodge v.
Wetzler, 69 N. J. L. 49o (19o3).
Parents of the husband have the same
right as the parents of the wife to advise the child. Rice v. Rice, 1O4 Mich.
371 (1895).
The sincerity of the husband's affection has been held an
element in determining the amount of damages. Payne v. Williams, 63 Tenn.
583 (1874). So also the fact that the relations were unhappy and hence the
loss of the wife of less moment may be shown in evidence to reduce the
damages. Gilchrist v. Bale, 8 Watts 355 (Pa. 1839).
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF ONE PARENT AS
BY OTHER PARENT FOR DEATH OF MINOR CHILD--A child of

BAR TO

ACTION

ten was killed in

an accident of which the negligence of the father, who was killed at the
same time, was the proximate cause. The mother sued for the death of
the child. Held: The negligence of the father was imputed to the mother,
and constituted a complete defense. Darbrinsky v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,
248 Pa. 503 (1915).

This question in its exact form has never before arisen in Pennsylvania,
but the decision is in accord with the general rule in cases involving the
negligent killing of children, where both parents are alive and join in the
action, the contributory negligence of either being attributed to the other
and forming a complete bar to recovery as against both. Johnson v. Reading
City Passenger Rwy. Co., 16o Pa. 647 (1894) ; Rapaport v. Pittsburgh Rwys.
Co. 247 Pa. 347 (1915).
The basis of the decision in the principal case is that, because of the
parental relation, the father was the agent of the mother in the custody of
the child. His negligence is imputed to her, and bars her recovery as though
he were alive and a party to the action. This is contrary to the weight of
authority. Charlotte Air Line Rwy. Co. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369 (1893) ; Louisville, etc., Rwy. Co. v. Creek, 130 Ind. 139 (1891); Donk Bros. Coal Co. v.

Leavitt, 1O9 Ill. App. 385 (19o3). The wife has been held to be the agent of
the husband. McFadden v. Santa Ana, etc., Rwy. Co., 87 Cal. 464 (1891)
(based on reasons peculiar to the California Code); Vinette v. Northern
Pacific Rwy. Co., 47 Wash. 320 (1907). Likewise an elder sister in custody
of the child. Gress v. Phila. & Reading Rwy. Co., 228 Pa. 482 (191o). So
also a grandmother. Pratt Coal Co. v. Brawley, 83 Ala. 371 (1887). But
see contra, Walters v. C. R. F. & P. Rwy. Co., 41 Iowa 71 (1875). The
father is not held to be the agent of the mother in the care of the children
in any of the cases, although he has by common law and by statutes in many
of the states the control of the child until majority. Reading Township v.
Telfer, 57 Kan. 798 (1897); Senft v. Western Maryland Rwy. Co., 246 Pa.
446 (1914) ; Charlotte, etc., Rwy. Co. v. Gravitt, supra.

WILLS-UNDUE INFLUENCE-BURDEN OF PROoF-Where a legatee occupies a position of trust and confidence to the testator, and such legatee takes
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part or exercises some activity in the procurement of the execution of a
will, the burden of proof is shifted to the beneficiary to show that the instrument was not induced by undue influence. Keeble v. Underwood, 69 So.
473 (Ala. 1915).

Where a will has been executed and probate is opposed on the ground
that it was executed under undue influence, the burden of proof is on the
party so alleging. Baldwin v. Parker, 99 Mass. 79 (1868) ; Miles v. Treanor,
194 Pa. 43o (I9OO) ; Crossan v. Crossan, i69 Mo. 631 (i9o2).

But in some

jurisdictions, it has been held that the burden of overcoming alleged undue
influence rests upon the proponent of the will although the production of
the will properly executed raises the presumption that it was the free and
voluntary will of the testator, and makes it incumbent upon the contestants
to offer proof to overcome the prima facie case thus made out. Sheehan v.
Kearney, 21 So. Rep. 41 (Miss. 1896); in re Holman's Estate, 70 Pac. 9o8
(,Or. I9O2).' Apparently these jurisdictions draw a distinction between the
burden of producing evidence which shifts from party to party as the case
progresses, and the burden of proof, meaning the obligation to establish the
truth of the claim, which rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue. Egbers v. Egbers, 177 Ill. 82 (1898). Where a confidential relation exists between the testator and a beneficiary, who is not
the natural object of the testator's bounty and who was connected in some
way with the making of the will, a presumption of undue influence arises
and the burden of proof is generally cast upon the proponent. Campbell v.
Carlisle, 63 S. W. 701 (Mo. igoi) ; In re Barry's Will, 219 Ill. 391 (19o5).
WORxMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJuRY

AmsING OUr OF EMPLOYMENT-A

taxi-cab driver was ordered by his employer to drive an officer out to a
nearby fort, where because of the wind and noise he did not hear a sentry's
challenge and was in consequenc shot. Held: This was an injury "arising
out of" and "incurred in the course of" the employment. Thorn v. Humm
& Co., 112 L. T. 888 (Eng. 1915).
The rule established by the English decisions appears to be that if the
accident is of a sort to which the employment of the workman especially
exposes him, he may recover, although the general public is also exposed
to this type of accident. So recovery was allowed where an engineer was
injured by a small boy throwing a stone, Challis v. London, etc., R. R.
Co. [1905] 2 K. B. 154; so also a seaman recovered for a sunstroke occuring while painting a vessel, Morgan v. Genaida, 25 T. L. 446 (igog); so also
a gardener was allowed to recover for tetanus caused by running a nail in
his foot, Walker v. Mullins, 42 Ir. L. T. 168 (igo8). A stableman bitten by
the stable cat has been held especially exposed to this danger and entitled
to recovery. Mangea v. Wright [i9o9] i K. B. 963. So recovery has been
allowed an engineer of a merchant vessel injured by the explosion of a
But it
floating mine. Risdale v. Kilmannock, 112 L, T. Rep. 439 (915).
is difficult to reconcile these cases with other English decisions where there
was considered to be no special exposure. Thus where an engine-driver on
a farm died of blood poisoning caused by the sting of a wasp, no recovery
was allowed. Amys v. Barton, io5 L. T. Rep. 619 (1912). So also a lady's
maid sewing by a window was not allowed to recover for an injury to her
eye incurred in warding off a bird which flew into the room. Craske v.
Wigan [I909] 2 K. B. 635. Nor was a baker's delivery boy allowed to recover for a frozen hand. Warner v. Couchman [igii] i K. B. 35.
While there are comparatively few American decisions on the subject,
the English rule seems to be followed. Thus a workman employed on a
dock was allowed to recover for an injury received from a drunken fellowworkman.

In re Employer's Liability Assurance Co., 216 Mass. 71 (913);

in re Brighton, r07 N. E. 527 (Mass. i915). But recovery was refused
where a driver, who had previously suffered from loss of mental faculties,
became dazed, while driving his employer's team, and died of exposure.

RECENT CASES
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Milliken's Case, 216 Mass. 293 (1914). So also an inspector of factories,
whose duties compelled -him to take trips to various cities, was not allowed
to recover for injuries received by falling on an icy street while returning
from one of his trips. Hopkins v. Michigan Sugar Co., i5o N. W. 325
(Mich. 1915). Nor was a servant sent to mail a letter allowed to recover
for injuries received from a fall caused by slipping on a banana peel. Sheldon v. Needham, W. C. & Ins. Rep. 274 (Mich. 1914).

Yet a railroad em-

ployee recovered when in crossing a public street to a toilet he was struck by
an automobile and thrown on the tracks where he was run down by his
employer's train. Zabriskie v. Erie R. R. Co., 88 AtI. 824 (N. J. 1913). Moreover, where a fellow-employee in sport feinted at another, who in dodging the
blow fell and died of his injuries, recovery was allowed. Hulley v. Moosberger, 93 Ad. 79 (N. J. 1915).

